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THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE

c/

By Robert E. More of the Denver Bar

LTHOUGH there are earlier cases bearing on the
"Attractive Nuisance" Doctrine, there was little direct
discussion of it before 1870, and it is probable that
the general interest of the profession in the question was first
excited by the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in 1873 in Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stout.'
In other countries the question has not received as much
judicial discussion as in the United States. Various English
cases have been cited in the American courts, but none of
them appears to be a direct decision. Thus Lynch v. Nurdin'
is often referred to as being in support of the doctrine of the
Stout case. In the English case, a man left his horse and
cart unattended in a public street. A child got upon the cart
in play and was hurt. The owner was held liable. There
the alleged "attractive" chattels were left in a public place
where the plaintiff and the defendant "had an equal right to
be." This, of course, is very different from the case where
the owner leaves the chattel on his own land, where the child
has no right to come. The distinction is clearly pointed out
by Mr. Justice Peckham in a leading New York case.' The
English authorities are in confusion.'
The point has been considered in the Scotch courts, but
the law there does not seem decisively settled.'
In Australia the court of New South Wales favors the
land owner.'
The Doctrine is, therefore, not only typically American,
but is chiefly developed in the American cases. The Stout

C

2-17 Wall. 657.
2-(1841) I Q.B. 29.
'-Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 145 N. Y. 301 at 311, 312.

*-See Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 2nd Ed. 436; Bevtn on Negligence, 2nd Ed. 183-190.
--- See Glegg on Reparation, 231-232; and Guthrie Smith on Damages, 144-147.
-- See Patterson v. Borough of Woollahra, 16 New South Wales Law Reports-Cases of Law, 229;
also Slade v. Victorian Railway, 15 Victorian Law Reports, 190.
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case, as is well known, was one where a turntable owned by
a railroad was left unlocked and unguarded, although it was
so located that children could be attracted to it from places
where they might lawfully be, and although the railroad had
actual knowledge that children had been in the habit of playing upon it in the past.
Following the Stout case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the famous case of Keffe v. Milwaukee and St. Paul
R. Co. 7 fortified the Federal decision and laid down, it is sub-

mitted, sounder principles for the future application of the
doctrine.
Since that time, many courts have had occasion to accept
or reject in whole or in part the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
Courts of New Hampshire, Tennessee, Massachusetts and
New York have flatly refused to follow the Stout case, even
in the case of a turntable. In cases of alleged "dangerous
attractions" other than turntables, decisions favorable to the
land owner have been rendered in Arkansas, California, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
A very eminent authority upon the law of Torts has
argued at length that the doctrine is unsound and should never
be applied.'
From the welter of decisions on this subject, it is somewhat difficult to state definitely just what the law is. It is
believed, however, that the four general principles to be
developed hereinafter are supported not only by the numerical
weight of authority, but also by sound legal principles. What,
then, are the essential elements of the Attractive Nuisance
Doctrine as laid down in decisions by courts which support
this theory of a landowner's liability to children?
1. There is no general legal duty, either to children or
adults who enter defendant's Property without invitation,
express or implied, to keep dangerous things from one's land
or to use care about them.
-0(875)
21 Minn. 207.
'-See article by Jeremiah Smith in II Harvard Lato Review, at pages 349 and 434. This article
reviews all the cases that had been decided up to the time the article was published and
authorities in support of statements heretofore made may be found at the end of Judge Smith's
discussion. See also an article by Manley 0. Hudson in 36 H.L.R. 836.
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It is elementary that no duty is owed to trespassers, other
than the duty not to injure them wilfully. Accordingly,
where a trespasser has been injured, it is immaterial whether
or not defendant has failed to exercise due care. There being
no duty, the question of due care is never reached. Of course
defendant cannot injure plaintiff intentionally. Traps and
spring guns are within this latter category.
The Supreme Court of the United States held in a recent
decision, which modified the earlier holding in the Stout case
to a considerable degree, that "infants have no greater right
to go upon other people's land than adults, and the mere fact
that they are infants imposes no duty upon land owners to
expect them and prepare for them."'

This fundamental principle was recognized by the Colo-

rado Supreme Court in the case of Hayko v. Coal Company."°

There plaintiff, a boy ten years old, entered an open rough
board shack on defendant's premises and abstracted therefrom
a box of dynamite caps. Plaintiff tried to pick out the contents of one of the caps with a pin; it exploded and blew off
parts of several fingers. The plaintiff contended that the
shack and caps were an attractive nuisance and that in any
event defendant was negligent in keeping the caps where
children could get them. On this second proposition the
Court said:
"We know of no general legal duty either to children or adults who

enter without invitation, express or implied, to keep dangerous things from
one's land or to use care about them, and yet plaintiff's argument premises such
a duty. It may be conceded, as far as this point is concerned, that I may not
wilfully set a trap, e.g., a spring gun, that I owe a duty of care so as not to
entrap one whom I have impliedly invited, as by a walk and steps built up
to my front door, or a child whom I have tempted to trespass, and that what
would not be a trap to an older person would be to a very young one, but
these points do not reach the plaintiff's proposition and we do not assent to it."
2. The doctrine is inapplicable unless defendant knowingly keeps upon his premises in an unguarded condition an
instrumentality that is "unusually" alluring to children.

The Federal Supreme Court said in the United Zinc
Case supra:
'-United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van'Britt (decided March 27, 1922) 258 U. S. 268; 42 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 299; 66 Law Ed. 615 at 617.
"1---77 Colorado, 143.
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"On the other hand, the duty of one who invites another upon his land,
not to lead him into a trap, is well settled, and while it is very plain that
temptation is not invitation, it may be held that knowingly to establish and
expose, unfenced, to children of an age when they follow a bait as mechanically
as a fish, something that is certain to attract them, has the legal effect of an
invitation to them, although not to an adult. But the principle, if accepted,
must be very cautiously applied."

A few courts have failed to heed the admonition of the
Federal Supreme Court that the doctrine "must be cautiously
applied". The majority of jurisdictions, however, have
recognized that the doctrine must be narrowly limited and
that great injustice will result unless the Federal Supreme
Court's admonition isheeded.
This is the law in Colorado. In the Hayko case Judge
Denison said:
"Courts have said and held that it is negligent to maintain on one's
own premises any agency that is dangerous and attractive to children. This
proposition has been condemned by some courts and even ridiculed. * * *
It leads to such absurdities that it is easy to ridicule it; for example, an apple
tree bearing green apples is such an agency. It will not do to say that every
attractive thing is sufficient to charge a defendant with negligence in enticing
children to trespass, because there is nothing that can be said not to be attractive to a child. * * * The attraction must be unusual * * * and we think
that, as a matter of law, a shack in a mining camp is not an unusual attraction."

3. The doctrine is not applicable unless the instrumentality in question is so located that children can be attracted
to it without first committing a trespass.

It is obvious that this exceptional doctrine can have no
applicability unless the attractive, dangerous instrumentality
is so situated that children may be attracted by it when acting
within their rights. If the child must first become a trespasser
before he can even see the dangerous instrumentality in question, then the doctrine cannot be availed of by him.

The reason for this rule is apparent. We have the basic
principle that no duty is owed to a trespasser save to refrain
from injuring him wilfully or by traps. Even though a defendant carelessly maintains upon his premises a dangerous
instrumentality he is not liable to a trespasser for the very
obvious reason that he owes no duty to one who is trespassing.
Children are considered as invitees rather than trespassers,
IF defendant has maintained upon his premises something
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that is so "unusually" attractive that they are drawn to it "as
mechanically as a fish is drawn to a bait." But it is obvious
that the trespass is never excused nor the invitation implied
unless the child is in fact attracted by the alluring nuisance.
To put a clear case, if a ten-year-old boy climbs over the high
board fence surrounding the plant of the General Chemical
Company near Valverde, Colorado, and then while wandering around is attracted to a stationary ladder on a vat of sulphuric acid, climbs up and falls in it, it would be entirely
immaterial that this ladder and vat were the most attractive
things in the world, to children. The child was a trespasser
when he climbed over the fence. The ladder and vat were
not visible to him until AFTER he became a trespasser. His

trespass is not excused therefore by the attractive nuisance, as
the vat and ladder were not visible to the child when he was
at any place where he had a right to be. No implied invitation was extended to him to climb up the ladder. The child
was not following the figurative bait but was wilfully trespassing upon another's property.
The Supreme Court of Illinois" first announced this
qualification of the general doctrine. In the case just cited
the dangerous instrumentality was a hoist used by defendant
to elevate bricks and mortar in a building under construction.
Plaintiff went into the building without being attracted by
the hoist, and having thiss trespassed saw the hoist, put his
hand upon it and was injured. In holding for the defendant
the Court said, at page 170:
"It is a necessary element of the liability that the thing which causes
the injury is tempting to children, and constitutes a means of attracting them
upon the premises, which the owner should anticipate. The dangerous thing
must be so located so as to attract them from the street or some public place
where they may be expected to be. An owner would not be liable if he
maintained something for his own use which might be dangerous, but which
would only be found by the children going upon his premises as trespassers."

In the United Zinc Case, Supra, the Federal Supreme

Court adopted the Illinois rule.
This same distinction has been made by the Colorado
Supreme Court in the Hayko Case, Supra. The Court first
held that the shack itself was not "unusually attractive"; then
"--McDermott v. Burke, 256 I1. 401; 100 N. E. 168.
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in answer to plaintiff's contention that dynamite caps constituted an attractive nuisance, the Court pointed out that "plaintiff could not see the box of caps till he had trespassed, therefore, the caps cannot be classed as the attraction."
4. The doctrine is not applicable unless children have
been attracted by the nuisance before and defendant knows of
this fact.
In the United Zinc Case, Supra, Mr. Justice Holmes was

considering a poisonous body of water that looked clear and
attractive. This body of water had not been frequented by
children prior to this time and in holding for defendant, Mr.
Justice Holmes said at page 617:
"It does not appear that children were in the habit of going to the
place, so that foundation also fails."

In Hardy vs. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co."2 defendant main-

tained a concrete conduit, seven hundred feet long, covering
a shallow stream. The ends were open. At times defendant
discharged hot water from its boilers through this conduit.
A boy twelve years old attempted to walk through this conduit and was killed by a discharge of steam and hot water.
The evidence established that children had walked through
this conduit on at least three instances prior to the accident in
question, but there was no evidence that defendant knew this
fact. The lower coukt directed a verdict for defendant, and
the case was heard on appeal by Judges Sanborn, Stone and
Munger. In affirming the decision of the lower court, Judge
Stone says :".
"Nothing approaching knowledge by defendant of any passage through
the conduit of boys at any time was shown, and such knowledge cannot be
inferred nor imputed from the three trips in the course of four years shown
in the evidence. Such knowledge cannot be founded upon the circumstances
that children played about the openings of the conduit. There is no limit,
except physical ability, to what a child may do."

No attempt has been made to cover many of the numerous
fascinating branches of this doctrine. The few principles outlined above being sponsored by the Colorado Supreme Court,
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 8th Circuit or the Federal
'2--266 Fed. 860 (C. C. A. 8th Circuit).
"-At page 861.
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Supreme Court are of interest to Colorado lawyers and cqntrolling in this state until these respective tribunals take a
different view of the matter. It is believed that these fundamentals will furnish a basis for deciding most attractive nuisance cases and are based upon sound legal principles. May
it be hoped, therefore, that in this jurisdiction the courts will
continue to adhere to this humane, logical and well supported
group of rules.

"BY LEAVE OF COURT FIRST HAD, * * *"
By Horace N. Hawkins, Jr., of the Denver Bar

N the State of Colorado, and especially in its more populous
counties, more criminal prosecutions for serious offenses
are initiated by direct information filed by the district
attorney, than by any other method. Incarceration of the defendant, if he does not post the required bail, or if bail be
denied him, follows the filing of the information as a matter
of course. The defendant named in the information may not
be deprived of his liberty without due process of law, and the
district attorney is not invested by law with any judicial
authority the exercise of which renders imprisonment pursuant to his judgment a legal imprisonment. How then, is the
deprivation of the liberty of the individual upon the filing of
an information by the district attorney justifiable? It is the
purpose of this article to discuss this question, (although with
no pretense of exhaustive research, let it be here confessed),
and the interrogatory corallary thereto as to what attack, if
any, may a defendant imprisoned after the filing of such an
information make upon his further detention, and upon what,
if any, grounds should he be released therefrom.
Section 3 of Article II of the Constitution of the State of
Colorado is as follows:
"That all persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights,
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness."

Section 7 of Article II is in, the following language:
"That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search
any place or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the
place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be,
nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to
writing."

Section 8 of Article II provides:
"That until otherwise provided by law, no person shall, for a felony,
be proceeded against criminally otherwise than -by indictment, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual
service in time of war or public danger. In all other cases, offenses shall
be prosecuted criminally by indictment or information."
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And finally,
Section 21 of the same article, known as the "Bill of
Rights," guarantees
"That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."

These provisions of our fundamental law, together with
the first clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, constitute the basis on which the argument herein is built.
Pursuant to the section 8 of Article II of the Colorado
Constitution, for many years the only method for prosecuting
one charged with the commission of a felony was by indictment. In the year 1891 the legislature enacted the first statute
giving the district attorney the right to file an information in
a felony case. It is to this enactment, which appears on pages
240-243 of the session laws of 1891, and to the decisions of our
courts thereunder, to which attention is now directed. The
pertinent sections of that act are as follows:
"Section 1. The several courts of this State shall have, and may
exercise the same power and jurisdiction to hear, try and determine prosecutions, upon information for crimes, misdemeanors and offenses, to issue writs
and process and do all other acts therein as in cases of like prosecution under
indictment.
"Sec. 2. All informations shall be filed in term time, in the court
having jurisdiction of the offenses specified therein, by the district attorney
of the proper county as informant, and his name shall be subscribed thereto,
either by himself or by his deputy, and the names of the witnesses shall be
endorsed thereon. All informations shall be verified by the oath of the
district attorney, or his deputy, or by the oath of some person competent to
testify as a witness in the case; the verification by the district attorney or his
deputy may be upon information and belief. The district attorney shall
also indorse upon said information the names of such other witnesses as may
afterwards become known to him, at such time, before the trial, as the
court may, by rule or otherwise prescribe."

It will be noted that under the last section the following
five requirements are prescribed for an information:
1. It shall be filed in term time,
2. by the district attorney as informant,
3. the district attorney's name shall be subscribed thereto per se or by deputy,
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4.

5.

It shall be verified by
a. the district attorney or his deputy who may
do so on information and belief, or
b. by the oath of some person competent to
testify as a witness in the case.
The names of the witnesses for the prosecution must
be endorsed thereon.

"Sec. 3. The offense charged in any information shall be stated in
plain, concise language, without prolixity or unnecessary repetition. Different offenses, and the different degrees of the same offense, may be joined in
one information in all cases where the same might be joined by different
counts in one indictment; and in all cases the defendant shall have the same
rights as to all proceedings therein, as he would have if prosecuted for the
same offense under indictment."

Section 4 prescribes a form of information and forms of
verification to be used by the district attorney and by a person
competent to testify as a witness in the case.
"Sec. 5. All provisions of law applying to prosecutions upon indictments, to writs and process therein, and the issuing and service thereof,
to motions, pleadings, trials and punishments, or the passing or execution of
any sentence, and to all other proceedings in cases of indictment, whether in
court of original or appellate jurisdiction, shall to the same extent and in
the same manner as near as may be, apply to informations and to all prosecutions and proceedings thereon."

This last section is important because it authorizes the
issuance of a capias by the clerk on the filing of the information.
"Sec. 6. Any person who may according to law, be committed
jail or become recognized or held to bail, with sureties for his appearance
court, to answer to any indictment, may in like manner, be so committed
jail or become recognized and held to bail for his appearance to answer
any information or indictment as the case may be."

to
in
to
to

Section 7 provides for the inquiry by the district attorney
into all cases of preliminary examination, and for the filing by
him of his reasons in the event that he determines that an
information ought not to be filed.
"Sec. 8. An information may be filed against any person for any
offense when such person has had a preliminary examination as provided by
law before a justice of the peace or other examining magistrate or officer
and has been bound over to appear at the next term of the court having juris-
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diction or shall have waived his right to such examination. But if a preliminary examination has not been had or when upon such examination the
accused has been discharged or when in the opinion of the district attorney
the affidavit or complaint upon which examination has been held is defective
or when such affidavit or complaint has not been delivered to the clerk of
the proper court the district attorney may upon affidavit of any person who
has knowledge of the commission of an offense and who is a competent witness to testify in the case, setting forth the offense and the name of the person
or persons charged with the commission thereof upon being furnished with
the names of the witnesses for the prosecution by leave of court first had,
file an information, and process shall forthwith issue thereon."

From the last section, it is clear that in a case where no
preliminary examination has been had, the information, in
addition to complying with the five requirements specified
by section 3 of the act must meet the following additional
requirements:
6. There must be an affidavit of a person
a. who has knowledge of the commission of the
offense,
b.
c.

such affiant must be a competent witness to
testify in the case.
such affidavit must set forth the offense and
the name of the person charged with the
commission thereof.

7.

The district attorney must be furnished with the
names of the witnesses for the prosecution,

8.

The district attorney must first obtain leave of court
to file the information.

NoTE:

This article will be continued in the June number of DicrA.
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COMPARE ROSSI VS. COLORADO PULP AND
PAPER COMPANY
"After a very careful consideration of the case, I'find myself unable to
agree with either the opinion of Justice Sayre or that of Justice Anderson;
and, owing to the fact that a majority of the court does not agree upon either
opinion as to the law, I feel constrained to give my reasons of dissent from
both views. A further reason why I think it proper is that a majority of the
court disagree with each of these opinions, and, if I understand it correctly,
a majority of the court agree with me in dissenting from each opinion. If I
am mistaken in that, it at least seems true that a majority of the court do not
concur in either opinion, while all but myself agree that the judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed." Evans, J., in Hudgens v. Creola Lumber
Co., 164 Ala. 561.
"Notwithstanding the earnest, almost violent, argument of learned counsel, we adhere to our former opinion." Root, J., in Hall v. Baker Furniture
Co., 86 Neb. 389.
"The foregoing are the views of the writer, but all the other members of
the court are of a different opinion." Myers, J., in Union Traction Co. v.
Howard, 173 Ind. 335.

JUST WHAT WE THINK
"There is nothing about the practice of the profession of the law which
makes the business dangerous to the public. It does not threaten the public
health or safety, nor is it demoralizing to the public." Sonora v. Curtin, 137
Cal. 585.

WRITE YOUR OWN HEAD FOR THIS ONEWE'RE AFRAID
"The writer is himself a farmer, and has been one for more than forty
years." Ross, J., in Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 Fed. 825.

COLORADO IS AN OLD STATE-WE
FOUND THAT OUT
"Some lawyers act as though they thought that because Oklahoma is a
new State that they can do as they please, and that any kind of conduct will
be tolerated. In this they are greatly mistaken, as some of them will discover
to their sorrow, if they do not heed our admonition." Furman, P. J., in
Crawford v. Ferguson, 115 Pac. 278.
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DISSENT A LA WISCONSIN
Timlin, J., harboring an impression that the majority had overruled certain early and long-cherished precedents, dissented as follows:
"Now it may be that these precedents deserved this fate. They perhaps
deserved death in order that we all might live. They were certainly guilty of
being old. They were not innocent of having been born at the wrong time.
They perhaps distracted the circuit judges in the consideration of the scholastic
distinctions concerning lack of ordinary care. Like primeval man before his
fall, unconscious of sin, they neglected to cover themselves with foliage. They
obtruded their classic clearness and simplicity against the turgid top-liftiness
which closed the nineteenth and began the twentieth century. They failed to
stand for any corporate privilege or advantage. For all this they perhaps deserved amortization. But before Oblivion's curtain falls upon them forever,
let me say that in my youth, before professional success and competence and
a seat on the supreme bench had their value impaired by realization, and while
such things were bright with the glamor of anticipation, these precedents
seemed to me profound in their wisdom, unimpeachable in their authority, and
clear, definite, and correct in their doctrine. Mentors of my bright days,
farewell !"

THEM SOUTHERN JUDGES
"Some of the witnesses testified he a few times, when provoked, cursed
her, though he certainly was not in the habit of using profane language, if he
ever did, about which there is doubt; his common expressions being 'Dang it',
'Darn it', sometimes 'God damn it'." Lewis, J., in Gains v. Gains, 19 S. W.
929. Cf. Southern Co. v. Wiley, 88 Miss. 825, 841; 8 Dicta (6) 22.

WE ALWAYS LIKED THIS STORY
Albert G. Craig was defending before a country justice, and made reference to a verbal agreement between the parties. "Let's see yer verbal agreement", said the justice. "Hand it up here."

GIVE 'EM A MEDAL
"The opinion of the court was delivered by Ogden, J., affirming the
decree of the chancellor. The reporter regrets that, after diligent search and
inquiry, he has been unable to find it." Hunterdon Bank v. Nassau Bank, 17
N. J. Eq. 496.

ANNOUNCEMENT
The Editors desire to say, in response to any number of requests for information, that it is purely a coincidence that the Dictaphun and Colorado
Supreme Court Decisions departments are in juxtaposition.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
DENVER-No.
108930-People, ex. rel. Johnson vs.
Geo. F. Dunklee, Judge. Decided December 31, 1930.
Facts.-Action against Sheriff and Warden on their official bonds to
recover damages on account of the release from County Jail, by defendants,
of Roll, who had been committed on a body execution.
Defendants pleaded as defense Sections 8880 and 8887, C. L. 1921,
which provided that persons "sentenced to and imprisoned in any county
jail" may be allowed time off for good behavior. Demurrer.
Held.-That said statutes allowing time off to persons "sentenced" to
county jails are no authority for giving time off to persons "committed" to
county jails under body executions, but apply only to criminal cases.
Demurrer sustained.
DISTRICT

COURT,

Hershey, et al.

DISTRICT COURT, DENVER-No.

107364-Whiton vs. Sacino. J. C. Stark-

weather, Judge. Decided March 5, 1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff brought suit for specific performance of an alleged
contract of sale of real estate to the defendants, claiming that four monthly
payments of $900.00 each were past due. Defendants claimed to be liable
only for a reasonable rental. The court found all the issues in favor of the
plaintiff and rendered judgment for $3,600 and interest. Defendants sued
out a writ of error to the Supreme Court, which granted a writ of supersedeas. Plaintiff now applies to the lower court for the appointment of a
receiver pending the determination of the appeal.
Held.-Application denied. While the lower court generally has power
to appoint a receiver to preserve the property in question, after judgment
and pending appeal, plaintiff here seeks a receiver not to preserve the real
estate, but to accumulate a fund for which plaintiff can receive his $900.00
monthly payment. Such a receivership would be in furtherance of execution
of the decree, and is not within the power of the lower court when supersedeas
has been granted by the Supreme Court.

COURT, DENVER-NO. 110312-Deagle vs. Denver Tramway
Corporation. C. C. Sackmann, Judge. Decided March 23, 1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff's husband was injured by a street car operated by defendant corporation. Plaintiff, alleging negligence on the part of defendant's
servants, brought suit for $2,500.00 for loss of the services, support, and
companionship of her husband, and for $450.00, being expenses incurred due
to nursing and other expenses. Defendant demurred for want of facts.
Held.-Demurrer sustained. A wife has no legal standing to sue for
the loss of services of her husband (according to the great weight of authority,
there being no Colorado decision on this question.)
DISTRICT

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EoiTmO's NoTr.-lt is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

ELECTIONS-CONTESTS-DEMURRER-No.
Decided March 9, 1931.

12767-Gunson v.

Baldauf-

Facts.-The parties hereto were rival candidates for the office of county
commissioner, and contest was filed. The contestee filed answer and counterclaim, and in the answer embodied what purports to be a general demurrer,
and the Court below sustained the demurrer.
Held.-The action of contest was brought under Sections 7794 to 7804,
C. L. 1921, which created an exclusive and summary procedure for the contest of an election of certain persons. The statement of contest enumerated
sufficient facts to be good as against a general demurrer. Special demurrers
are not authorized by the statute and cannot be interposed. Because special
demurrers may not be interposed in contest of this character, and because the
statement of contest states sufficient facts, the Court below erred in sustaining
the general demurrer.
Judgment reversed.

UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT - REPRIMAND - No.
12469-People v. Marshall-Decided March 16, 1931.
Facts.-Respondent, a member of the Bar, an elderly man, found guilty
of misappropriation of $11.00 Court costs, and proceeds of two small claims
of clients.
Held.-Respondent reprimanded and directed to make restitution and
his failure to do so, or commission of other like acts will result in automatic
disbarrment.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW -

APPEAL AND ERROR--BILL

OF EXCEPTIONS-No

OFFICIAL

REPORTER-

NOTICE-No. 12758-Ehrenkrook v. Winchester-Decided March 16,
1931.
Facts.-Action for unlawful detainer brought by plaintiff in error in
Justice Court, where plaintiff prevailed. On appeal to County Court, defendant prevailed. Testimony in Justice Court was taken by reporter, but
testimony in County Court not reported. Plaintiff in error filed Bill of
Exceptions containing transcript of testimony in Justice Court with affidavit
of two persons that it was a substantially true and correct transcript, but
no notice served upon defendant in error. County Judge refused to settle
or allow Bill of Exceptions. Motion filed to dismiss (writ) and strike portions of Bill of Exceptions.
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Held.-I. Transcript of evidence taken in Justice Court not properly
a part of Bill of Exceptions because plaintiff in error did not comply with
Section 420 of Code.
2. Motion to dismiss writ of error granted because in the absence of
testimony, it is presumed there was no error.
Writ dismissed.
No. 12093SET OFFDISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCYBacher v. Lord-Decided March 16, 1931.
Facts.-Lord, plaintiff below, sought restraining order against collection
of a judgment, and to offset against judgment certain notes defendant had
given to a bank, and which plaintiff had purchased. It appeared that maker
of note filed petition in bankruptcy and had been discharged from payment of
notes. judgment for plaintiff.
Held.-I. Discharge in bankruptcy releases bankrupt from all provable
debts, except such as are excepted by the Bankruptcy Act.
2. Set off could not be allowed of debts discharged in bankruptcy.
Judgment reversed.
INJUNCTION

BAILMENT FOR HIRE-LIABILITY FOR RENTAL TO END OF TERM-FORFEIT-

URE-No. 12360-ElectricalProducts Corporation of Colorado v. Mosko
-Decided March 16, 1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, sued on contract for lease of
electrical sign, for full rental under contract, which provided for monthly
payments for 36 months, title to sign to remain at all times in lessor, lessor
to service sign and in case of default, right to take possession of sign and hold
it until paid, and when paid, lessee to again have sign for balance of term.
Also in.case of non-payment of rental installment lessor could declare rental
to end of term due.
Held.-I. Transaction is a bailment for hire.
2. While the general rule is that when the bailor resumes possession of
the hired chattel before the end of the bailment, he can only recover pro tanto
for payment of the hire, yet the bailee may agree to terms that will compel
him to continue payment.
3. In this case, the agreement made bailee liable for the rental for the
entire term of the contract.
Judgment reversed, with directions.

AGENCY-ESTOPPEL-FORGED NOTE-PAYMENT-No. 12385-The Colorado National Bank, of Denver v. Rehbein, et al.-Decided March 23,
1931.
Facts.-The Colorado National Bank sued to foreclose a deed of trust,
executed by Rehbein and given as security for the payment of her note for
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$3,000.00, payable to the order of Louis A. Siener and to cancel a release of
said deed by the public trustee, and to recover personal judgments against
Rehbein, Giggal and Giggal for the principal of said note. Siener delivered
said note for $3,000.00 to the Colorado National Bank with the deed of trust
as collateral security for a loan of $3,000.00. Rehbein at no time knew that
the Bank held her note and deed of trust. Siener's note was renewed from
time to time. Mrs. Rehbein conveyed the real estate subject to the deed of
trust, to Giggal and wife who thereafter, with the bank's knowledge, made
all interest payments to Siener personally. Siener had forged a duplicate of
the note and endorsed the payments on the forged note. The Colorado
National Bank, without the consent of the maker or of the Giggals, permitted
Siener to endorse on said note an extension of the time of payment thereof.
judgment for defendants below.
Held.-1. The payment to Siener constituted a defense against the
Colorado National Bank.
2. The Bank permitted Siener to represent himself as the ostensible
owner and holder of the Rehbein note and deed of trust and to collect interest
thereon, and to endorse an extension thereon.
3. This established an agency by implication.
4. If Siener had disclosed this agency to the Giggals, they could have
required the production and cancellation of the original note, but in order to
avoid such disclosure, Siener forged a similar note and caused the Giggals to
believe it to be genuine, and to make payment thereof. Payment to Siener
because of his ostensible ownership coupled with his undisclosed agency to
collect principal and interest of said note operates as a complete defense
against bank's claim.
5. The bank was estopped to deny Siener's ownership.
Judgment affirmed.
REAL

PROPERTY-COVENANT

OF

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONs-No.

WARRANTY-COvENANT

OF

SEISIN-

12226-Stone and Kochevar v. Rozich-

Decided March 23, 1931.
Facts.-Stone and Kochevar failed in the Court below in their action
against Rozich to recover damages for alleged breaches of two covenants in a
deed given to them by Rozich. Two causes of action were alleged: (1) for
breach of covenant of a warranty; (2) for breach of covenant of seisin. The
plaintiffs are here complaining of the judgment dismissing their action.
Held.-I. The plaintiffs were not entitled to recover on the covenant
of warranty. Possession was delivered to and taken by them. That possession never was menaced within the meaning of the applicable statute. There
never were any legal proceedings to obtain possession from the plaintiffs
except the foreclosure proceeding which does not come within the terms of
that statute.
2. The plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for breach of the covenant
of seisin. Assuming that there was a breach of this covenant and that a cause
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of action on the covenant once existed, this right of action was barred by the
statute of limitations because by the great weight of authority this covenant,
where a statute does not otherwise provide does not run with the land but is
a purely personal covenant. It runs in the present as of the date of the deed
and the breach, if any, occurs and the cause of action arises immediately upon
the giving of the deed. The deed was given in 1921, and the action on the
covenant of seisin was not commenced until 1926, which was more than three
years thereafter, and the right of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Judgment affirmed.
AND GAS-WORKING AGREEMENT-ABANDONMENT-No.
12439The Yarg Producing and Refining Company, et al. v. The Iles Investment
Company-Decided March 30, 1931.
Facts.-The Yarg Producing and Refining Corporation prosecutes this
writ of error to review a decree of the lower court quieting title to real estate
in The Iles Investment Company. The Iles Investment Company in 1923
deeded certain real estate to one Ahearn, reserving one-eighth ( ) of oil and
gas, and conveyed subject to a working agreement for development of the
land, which was contained in a separate instrument, reference to which was
made in the deed, which said separate instrument was recorded at the same
time. As part payment Ahearn delivered Trust Deed on the same real estate
and upon seven-eighths' (7/) interest in oil and gas. Later, the trust deed
was foreclosed, and trustee's deed executed and delivered to the Iles Investment Company, and possession taken by it. Before foreclosure Ahearn executed oil and gas lease to plaintiff in error. The Yarg Producing and Refining Corporation, which drilled a dry hole and abandoned the property in
April, 1925, and made no further claim thereto until the institution of this
suit, but claimed as assignee under the working agreement.
Held.-I. If there was any evidence that the Yarg Producing and
Refining Corporation was ever assignee of the working agreement, it lost its
rights by abandonment.
2. The operating agreement was not a conveyance of mineral rights,
but was a contract for development.
3. The purpose of such an agreement in undeveloped territory is to
determine the presence of oil and gas and is not drawn with the intent or
purpose to give a perpetual right to explore for oil.
Judgment affirmed.
OIL

WORKMENS

COMPENSATION-METHOD

OF COMPUTATION

OF

WAGES-

No. 12760-Wiliams Bros. Inc., et al. v. Grimm-Decided March 30,
1931.
Facts.--Grimm was awarded compensation for an injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment; during the twenty-six (26) week period
preceding the injury, he worked for fifteen (15) weeks and earned $418.00,
and was on a vacation for eleven (11) weeks thereof. The Commission
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awarded him compensation under Section 4421 C. L. 1921 (B), by dividing
$418.00 by twenty-six (26) weeks. The District Court ordered the Commission to enter an award under Section 4421 (c) which provides among
other things, that where the method given under subdivision (b), by reason
of illness or other reason the average weekly wage would not be a fair
measure that the Commission can use the daily earnings or other reasonable
method to compute the average weekly wage. His average weekly wage,
under (b) was $16.08, and under (c) was $27.08, and the District Court
ordered the commission to pay on the basis of average weekly wage of $27.67.
Held.-The District Court was right in ordering the Commission to
make award under Section 4421 (c), but was wrong in directing a specific
award of a certain sum per week. The amount is for the Commission to
decide.
Judgment modified.
ExECUTORS

AND ADMINISTRATORS-WIDOW'S

ALLOWANCE-No.

12786-

Ahlf vs. King, Admin.-Decided April 6, 1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff in error, and plaintiff below, who was widow of deceased, moved for an appraisal of the specific items of property allowable to
her as widow, and filed her application for widow's allowance. King, as
administrator de bonis non, resisted claim and claim was disallowed. Husband
of plaintiff died intestate and plaintiff was his sole and only surviving heir at
law. She was appointed administratrix, made no claim for widow's allowance, closed the estate, and received approximately $20,000.00 as sole heir.
Later, brother of deceased, on discovery of additional assets had estate reopened and administrator de bonis non appointed, filed his claim against the
estate, and if widow's allowance had been allowed there would have been
nothing to apply on his claim.
Held.-I. A claim for widow's allowance is part of the expense of
administration.
2. In the original proceedings, the widow made no claim for widow's
allowance.
3. The widow, having received about $20,000.00 from her deceased
husband's estate, suffered no financial loss and the estate having a net value of
more than $2,000.00 so that it is immaterial whether she received the sum
of $2,000.00 as a widow's allowance or its equivalent as an heir at law.
Judgment affirmed.
NEGLIGENCE-CHILDREN

PLAYING ON UNSAFE

DITCH BANK-DIRECTED

VERDIcT-No. 12488--Smith, et al. vs. The Windsor Reservoir and Canal

Company-Decided April 6, 1931.
Facts.-This is an action by parents for damages because of the death of
their minor son by drowning in an outlet ditch owned and used by the defendant-in-error in connection with the reservoir. The Court directed a verdict for the defendant in error and entered judgment on the verdict.

DICTA
The child, seven years old, was precipitated into the water and drowned
by the giving way of a false bank, composed of drifted sand blown upon ice
formed in the ditch. This condition was of annual occurrence and there was
evidence that the defendant in error knew of the condition, and knew that
children frequently played upon the false bank.
Held.-There was proof that defendant knew of the danger and the
fact that children actually played on the false bank, and yet permitted them
to do so. Evidence offered was sufficient to go to the jury and it was error
not to have submitted the case to the jury.
Judgment reversed.
APPEAL

AND

ERROR-IMPERFECT

ABSTRACT

OF

RECORD-VIOLATION

OF

RULE 36 OF THE SUPREME COURT-No. 12315-Kestle et al. vs. Preuit

-Decided April 6, 1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff below, defendant in error here, owned farm lands in
Arapahoe County and entered into contract with defendant below for exchange of this farm for farm lands in Park County. One of the terms of the
contract provided that the agreement was made subject to the right of plaintiff
to inspect and approve the Park County lands, and the plaintiff claimed that
he approved the Park County lands, but the defendants refused to convey, and
plaintiff's action was for damages for failure to convey. There was a verdict
of the jury for the plaintiff for $4,000.00, and judgment was entered thereon.
Held.-The abstract of record failed to summarize the evidence and the
instructions of the Court were not contained therein, and it was impossible to
determine from the abstract of record the questions which are argued in the
brief of the plaintiffs in error. We must presume from the condition of the
record before us that no prejudicial error was committed by the trial court.
It is incumbent upon a plaintiff in error to show error. It sufficiently appears
from the record that the testimony was more or less in conflict and we must
presume that in the absence of anything appearing in the record to the contrary, that the Court properly advised the jury on the law applicable to the
case.
Judgment affirmed.
BILLS

AND

NOTES-ESCROW-JUDGMENT

BY

CONFESSION-RENSTATING

ORIGINAL JUDGMENT-No. 12807-Axelson v. The Dailey Co-Operative Company, et al.-Decided April 6, 1931.
Facts.-The Dailey Co-Operative Company obtained judgment below
upon two promissory notes. Judgment was first entered by confession under
power contained in notes and was assigned to Kelsey who levied execution
upon lands of Axelson. Thereafter judgment was set aside upon motion and
showing of meritorious defense, upon terms that the defendant give bond for
value of land levied upon, to abide final judgment. Bond given, issues made
up and trial had and upon failure to sustain defense, original judgment was
reinstated.
Held.-I. On conflicting evidence judgment will not be ,disturbed.

DICTA
2. Judgment was not entered on confession before notes were due as
they contained a clause that upon failure to pay interest when due, entire
amount could be declared due.
3. The court did not err in reinstating original judgment. Defendant
was given full opportunity to present his defense, but having failed to establish
same, and plaintiff's proof being complete, the court had no alternative but
to reenter judgment. Judgment was complete as court had jurisdiction over
the person and the subject and it was within discretion of court to impose
terms on vacating original judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
PARTITION-TENANTS IN COMMON-LEASE AND MORTGAGE UPON PREMISEs-ALIENATION-No. 12768-McIntire vs. Midwest Theatres Com-

pany-Decided April 13, 1931.
Facts.-Plaintiff in error was defendant below.

The company brought

suit against him to partition property which was owned by the parties as
tenants in common. In May, 1922, McIntire and one Gill owned theatre
property in Sterling. They executed a 10 years lease thereon. In 1924, the
Midwest Theatres Company bought the interest of Gill and by consent of Mc-

Intire became the owner of the lease and in consideration of the reduction of
the rent, the rent was secured by a mortgage upon the premises and it was
further provided that a failure to pay promptly, should abrogate the reduction and restore the former rental. The court below granted partition, but
upon condition that Mclntire was to be protected in his rent for the premises
only in the event he became the purchaser at the partition sale.
Held.-( 1) The general rule is that a tenant in common is entitled
to partition.
(2)
But the right to partition may be alienated.
(3) . In this case, the company contracted it away. It agreed to pay
Mclntire the rent until May 1, 1932 and secured these payments by a mortgage upon the leased premises and it cannot by partition, release that mortgage
and evade rental payments.
Judgment reversed.
12772-Bullington vs. Grabow-Decided April 13, 1931.
Facts.-IThe parties to this election contest were rival candidates for the

ELECTIONS-ABSENT VOTER-ACT CONSTITUTIONAL-No.

office of county superintendent.
Two questions were presented (1) The
constitutionality of chapter 94, session laws of 1921, an act relating to absent

voters and (2) the sufficiency of certain votes cast thereunder.

Held.-The absent voters act is constitutional.

Under the constitution

of Colorado, a voter does not have to be personally present when "he offers
to vote". The purpose of the act is laudable. It permits and encourages the
exercise of the elective franchise by registered voters absent from their counties

or too ill to attend the polls.

DICTA
Section 3 of the act is mandatory in requiring that when absent
(2)
voter casts ballot, it must be accompanied by voter's affidavit identifying himself by duplicating his signature on the duplicate application and stating that
such voter received the ballot and exhibited to, and marked the same in the
presence of, election board or official authorized to administer oaths and that
the voter has not voted at such election or primary, otherwise than by such
ballot.
Judgment affirmed.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-OPINION

OF

SUPREME

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES-WHEN

COURT

REFUSED--No.

REQUESTED

BY

12832-Decided

April 18, 1931.
Facts.-This court is in receipt of House Resolution requesting an
opinion on proposed income tax law which had passed the house on 3rd. reading but which had not reached the Senate or the Governor. Three questions
were asked. (1) Has the legislature authority to adopt a flat or graduated
income tax. (2) Has it authority to use the proceeds thereof for certain
specified purposes. (3) Has it authority to provide certain exemptions therefrom.

Held.-Sec. 3, Article VI of our constitution provides, "The Supreme
Court shall give its opinion upon important questions upon solemn occasions
when required by the Governor, the Senate, or the House of Representatives"
(1) Sec. 3 authorizes an inquiry by the House only when a bill involving a
constitutional or publici juris question is before the body. (2) It authorizes
inquiry by the Governor only when such bill has been passed by 'both house
and senate and is before him for signature. (3) The bill is no longer before
the House and will never again be if its action be rejected or approved in toto
by the Senate. If so, no such "solemn occasion" will confront that body. If
otherwise, the Senate may not wish our opinion. If the Senate rejects the
bill, no question in relation thereto can confront the Governor. If it 'Passes
the bill, he may not wish our opinion. (4) Since the questions asked do not
fall within said sec. 3 the Court respectfully requests the House to withdraw
them.
Per Curiam.
CRIMINAL LAW-UNLAWFULLY

FORMATION-How

TRANSPORTING FISH-INSUFFICIENT

ATTACKED-No.

12795-Iwerks vs.

IN-

The People-

Decided April 20, 1931.
Facts.-Defendant was found guilty of unlawfully transporting fish and
sentenced to 30 days in county jail. The information charged that while lawfully in possession of the fish, that she did unlawfully transport the fish within
the State of Colorado without having obtained a permit from the state Game
and Fish Commissioner.
Held.-(1) Defendant's act as alleged in the information did not constitute a crime. Sec. 1507 C.L. 1921, merely provides one of the means of
obtaining a transportation permit for fish but only when and if the law re-
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quires such permit and when transportation is not otherwise provided for by
some other section of the act. It does not pretend to create a statutory crime

of any degree.

(2) Defendants objections in the form of motion in arrest of

judgment did not come too late. While it would have been better to make
all objections to the information before the plea of not guilty, yet where the
information is destitute of any criminal charge, objection can be taken at any
stage of the proceedings.
Judgment reversed.
ATTORNEys-DISBARM ENT-No. 12765--People vs. Cowen-Decided April

20, 1931.
Facts.-Cowen, an attorney at law, was convicted of unlawfully owning
a still for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor and sentenced to the penitentiary. Thereafter the Attorney General filed a petition to procure his disbarment on the ground that he had been convicted of a felony. He failed
to answer and default was entered but a referee was appointed nevertheless to
take proof and upon proof being taken, referee found him guilty.
Held.-Respondents conviction of this felony conclusively shows his disregard for law, inconsistent with his oath of office and indicates beyond question that he lacks the requisite moral character to engage in an honorable
calling such as the legal profession.
Respondent disbarred.
PROCEEDINGS-CONTEMPT-No.
12800Sweeney vs. Cregan and the District Court of Pueblo County-Decided
April 20, 1931.

JUDGMENTS-SUPPLEMENTARY

Facts.-Creganobtained judgment against Sweeney and upon execution
being returned unsatisfied, filed his verified petition for supplemental proceedings in aid of execution which resulted in an order commanding Sweeney
to appear and answer concerning his property. Defendant moved to set aside
and vacate order because no notice of application was given him, which was
denied. Defendant questioned the sufficiency of the petition and refused to
be sworn because he claimed that his answers might incriminate him.
Held.-( 1) The only prerequisite to the granting of an order for exam(2)
ination is the execution returned unsatisfied. No notice is required.
The petition contained all the allegations necessary. (3) When a witness
is called to testify and is sworn and interrogated, he may decline to answer
because to do so may incriminate him or tend to do so, but this privilege must
be claimed by the witness himself and subject to the determination of the
judge whether or not the answer will have that effect; but before this can
be determined, the question must first be asked and a witness cannot claim
this privilege before any question is asked, much less refuse to be sworn. The
defendant was clearly guilty of contempt in refusing to be sworn.
Judgment affirmed.

DICTA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PARTIAL Loss OF EYE-METHOD OF COMPUTING Loss-No. 12769-The Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. vs. The

Industrial Commission and Crawford-Decided April 20, 1931.

Facts.-Court below affirmed an award of Commission allowing compensation to injured employee. In addition to temporary disability, Commission found that the permanent disability consisted of 40% loss of vision
in left eye and that employee had previously lost all vision in right eye. Commission ordered that payment be made at rate of one half weekly wages for
temporary disability and one half weekly wages for 124.8 weeks for permanent
disability plus medical expenses.
Held.-This award was made under sec. 4450 C.L. 1921 but it should
have been made under sec. 4447 as amended by laws of 1929, chap. 186,
page 655. The legislature having made provision for compensation for disability arising from partial permanent impairment of vision based upon sec.
4447, as amended, and not having authorized an award in such cases to be
based upon sec. 4450, the Industrial Commission had no power to make the
award.

Judgment reversed with directions that award be based upon one half
of weekly wages for 40 per cent of 104 weeks.

RECEIVERSHIP-EXCEssIvE

FEES-CONTROL

OVER

LOWER

COURT-No.

12590-Sparling Coal Company v. Colorado Pulp & Paper Company, et
al.-Decided April 20, 1931.
Facts.-This was petition for rehearing and modification of the opinion,
Similar
the former opinion having been handed down January 13, 1931.
petitions were also filed in Myers v. Beck; Myers v. Pulp Company, and
Rossi v. Pulp Company.
Held.-I. In addition to the disallowance of the sum of $2,000.00
receiver's fees as directed in the former judgment the additional sum of
$12,500.00 allowed the receiver by the lower court is disallowed as excessive
and unwarranted; and the receiver is ordered to restore all fees allowed him
in excess of the sum of $5500.00.
Fees allowed attorneys Stidger and Walker affirmed.
3. Fees allowed attorneys Ginsburg and Gobble disallowed and remanded to lower court for further hearing.
2.

4. Order of trial judge transferring cause to another judge while this
cause was pending in the Supreme Court was wholly without jurisdiction.
5. Cause remanded with direction that all further proceedings in the
court below shall be conducted before the present presiding judge of the

second judicial district.
Opinion modified and rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Hilliard filed dissenting opinion.
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TRANSFER OF PROPERTY-Roberts vs. DietzNo. 12696-Decided April 27, 1931.
Facts.-Dietz recovered judgment against Roberts for damages sustained
in automobile collision. He then sued to set aside as fraudulent a trust deed
given by Esther Roberts to secure the payment of three promissory notes. The
Court below held that the conveyance was given to hinder, delay, and defraud
Dietz, which judgment was reversed and case remanded for a new trial. On
second hearing judgment below for plaintiff.
Held.-1. The trial court is the judge, not only of the credibility of
witnesses and of the weight of the evidence, but of. the inferences properly
deducible from the facts and circumstances as proved.
2. On review the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the
party successful in the trial court, and every inference fairly deducible from
the evidence is drawn in favor of the judgment.
3. In view of the facts in this case, and the close relationship and intimate association of the parties, the finding of the trial court that the transfer
of her property was fraudulent and transferred for the purpose of avoiding
payment of the judgment, was supported by the evidence, and the inferences
reasonably to be drawn therefrom.
Judgment affirmed.

JUDGMENT-FRAUDULENT

Insurance Society of Canton,
Ltd. vs. Robertson-No. 12585-Decided April 27, 1931.
Facts.-Robertson, plaintiff below, obtained judgment on policy of insurance for theft of his automobile. Plaintiff gave his son permission to use the
car, but no express authority to his son to let anyone else have the car. The
son and Elmer Carlson, and a young lady, drove to the apartment of William
Cosgriff where the son and Carlson became intoxicated, and started to take
the young lady home in the automobile, but went to another apartment, and
on the way, collided with another automobile. After arriving at the other
apartment, the son, on account of his condition was unable to continue any
further, and Carlson got the automobile key from Robertson's pocket and took
the young lady home, then returned the car to the Cosgriff apartment and left
the car there. The plaintiff's automobile was found to be damaged and the
key was on the floor of the automobile.
Held.-Under this state of facts, there was no larceny within the meaning of the statute, and there was no theft of the automobile within the terms
of the policy; the loss therefor was not covered by the policy.
Judgment reversed with directions.
AUTOMOBILE-INSURANCE-THEFT-Union

DICTA

JEWELS OF INDIVIDUALITY

JOS. I. SCHWARTZ
Maker and Retailer of 9uality .7ewelryfor Over Forty Years
633 SIXTEENTH STREET

Universities

Compliments

are, &,V 'rst.

of

to know what is afoot in the field of Government.
Among the paid subscribers to State
Government is the General Library
and/or the Law Library

of each of these Universities:
HARVARD
YALE
CALIFORNIA
SSOURI

ly

OREGON
CORNELL
DENVER
IOWA

MICHIGAN
PENNSYLVANIA
WISCONSIN
CHICAGO

r Legislature mees you will sadly need it.

Jifcrihe,to

so YA
I~V ERNMENT
STATE

2

SAMPLE

COPIES

FOR

2

2591 IN

PER

STAMPS

Published Monthly by

eAmerican Legislato rs'
Association
Box F .....

Denver Colo.

Brown

Palace
Hotel
VV

